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I. INTRODUCTION
Strength in numbers has been the foundation of labor unions
since the beginning of the organized labor movement. The num-
bers of union-represented employees in most industries, including
the construction industry, have dwindled in the last four decades,
however, and unions have seen their strength reduced commensu-
rately. The AFL-CIO Building and Trades Council has attempted
to combat this trend by encouraging union members to seek em-
ployment with non-union employers for the purpose of organizing
them. This technique is known as "salting." This Article describes
salting and the legal issues salting involves for the construction in-
dustry.
Part II of this Article defines and discusses the salting process
generally. Part III delves deeper, considering issues of voting eligi-
bility of union "salts" and manipulation of salts' status as employees
to gain access to employers' property. Part IV describes employers'
responses to salting, including legislative initiative, changing appli-
cation procedures, and state court actions. Part V concludes with a
summary of the current state of the law and suggests that employ-
ers should exercise considerable caution before instituting state
court lawsuits in response to salting.
II. THE BASICS OF SALTING
A. Salting as an Organizational Technique
As indicated by one of its dictionary definitions, the term "salt"
originated with the practice of artificially enriching mines by plac-
ing valuable minerals in them. The obvious purpose was to de-
fraud prospective buyers or investors by inflating the mine's poten-
tial. Despite its ignominious etymological origins, unions have
embraced the term "salt" in connection with an organizational
technique. The technique has been traced to the International
Workers of the World, who used it to organize lumber camps at the
turn of the century.
It is no secret that the percentages of union-represented em-
ployees in general, and represented employees in the construction
1. See Herbert R. Northrup, "Salting" the Contractors' Labor Force: Construction
Union Organizing with NLRB Assistance, 14J. LAB. RES. 469 (1993).
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industry in particular, have declined steadily since the mid-1950s.2
The prevailing view among construction trade unions is that the
decline in their membership has resulted in a loss of bargaining
strength. On this view, it follows that construction trade unions
must of necessity organize and maintain "a loose monopoly of the
manpower pool" in order to increase and ultimately regain their
prior bargaining strength.3
In April 1993, the AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades
Council announced an initiative to reverse the trend of declining
membership by initiating a "bottom-up" organizing campaign di-
rected at non-union construction industry employers.4 Because of
the potential for member resistance to increasing local unions'
membership ranks by including previously unrepresented employ-
ees, the AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades Council
adopted a membership training program known as Construction
Organizing Membership Education Training (COMET).
5 One of
the featured tactics of the construction trade unions' organizing
campaign is the use of salting.
In the context of union organizing, "salt" is both a noun and a
verb; it does not have a univocal meaning in either use. As a noun,
"salt" refers generally to an individual who seeks employment in
order to organize. A variety of different individuals fits this de-
scription.6 At one extreme are "salts" who are professional union
organizers holding full-time employment with a union.7 At the
other extreme are "salts" who are simply union members who vol-
2. See Note, Organizing Worth Its Salt: The Protected Status of Paid Union Organ-
izers, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1341, 1341 n.1 (1995) (indicating that union membership
declined from 25.8 percent in the early 1970s to 15.5 percent in the early 1990s).
3. See INTERNATIONAL BHD. OF ELEC. WORKERS, UNION ORGANIZATION IN THE
CONSTRUCrION INDUSTRY 2 (1994) [hereinafter UNION ORGANIZATION IN THE
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY]. This publication is widely referred to as the "orange
book." Michael J. Priem, Minnesota statewide organizer for the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), advised this author that the IBEW has
recently decided to abandon the "orange book" as the basis for its organizing.
According to Priem, the IBEW's emphasis henceforth will be on more traditional
organizing techniques, including resort to the Board's election processes.
4. See ASSOCIATED BUILDERS & CONTRACTORS, INC., COPING WITH COMET: A
GUIDE FOR MERIT SHOPS TO DEAL WITH ORGANIZATIONS (1993).
5. Seeid. at 3.
6. A "salt" is to be distinguished from a "pepper." The latter is a current
employee who is enlisted to perform the same or similar types of duties as a salt
would perform if hired.
7. See H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 71 (4th Cir. 1989); Sunland
Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1224 (1992).
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unteer or are deputized to engage in organizational activities. 8 Fi-
nally, some "salts" are rank-and-file union members who are reim-
bursed by the union for the difference in wages paid by the tar-
geted employer and wages they would have received under a union
contract. 9
"Salt" is also used as a verb to describe a technique of organiz-
ing. This technique may be employed overtly or covertly, and un-
ions may employ both strategies simultaneously.'0 Job applicants
who are overt salts wear clothing bearing union insignia, indicate
that they are union members and/or organizers on their job appli-
cations, or otherwise clearly inform the prospective employer of
their union affiliation and organizing intent. One of the obvious
purposes of disclosing this intent is to take away an employer de-
fense predicated on lack of knowledge of union membership or ac-
tivity. On occasion, union members/organizers appear en masse
in response to an advertisement or other notice that an employer is
hiring.
Job applicants who are covert salts deliberately attempt to con-
ceal their union affiliation and intent on their employment appli-
cations. Covert salts may omit references to prior employment with
union contractors or participation in joint employer-union appren-
ticeship programs. Covert salts may also deliberately falsify infor-
mation on an employment application. Obviously, covert salts omit
or falsify information to increase their chances of being hired.
Typically, covert salts disclose their union affiliation at some strate-
gic point during the employment relationship.
The constitutions or bylaws of many unions prohibit members
from working for non-union contractors. Such restrictions are
generally permissible." In order to engage in salting without vio-
lating these restrictions, unions typically enact "salting resolutions"
or otherwise expressly exempt their salts from the ban on working
8. See Fluor Daniel, Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 970,972 (1991).
9. See Town & Country Elec., Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1250, 1253 (1992), enforce-
ment denied, 34 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1994), vacated, 516 U.S. 85 (1995).
10. See Walz Masonry, Inc., No. 17-CA-18092, 1997 WL 402426, at *3
(N.L.R.B. July 16, 1997); Clock Elec., Nos. 8-CA-26560 & 8-CA-26646, 1997 WL
397544, at *2-3 (N.L.R.B.July 14, 1997). See generally INTERNATIONAL BHD. OF ELEC.
WORKERS, SALTING AS PROTECTED AcTivrTy UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
AcT (undated) (discussing overt and covert placement of union members in non-
union jobs).




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss3/2
"SALTING" THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
for non-union employers. 2 These exemptions often require union
members/organizers to leave their employment at the request of
their union.
3
Once employed, a salt attempts to organize the employer's
work force. In doing so, however, the salt must conduct himself or
herself consistent with normal work place expectations. The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has stated that "[i]f the or-
ganizer violates valid work rules, or fails to perform adequately, the
organizer lawfully may be subjected to the same nondiscriminatory
discipline as any other employee." 4 "Valid work rules" include
otherwise lawful no-solicitation rules."
Unions employ other tactics in conjunction with salting. For
example, unions often file charges or other complaints against
employers with various government agencies. Allegations that an
employer has violated state or federal safety and health provisions,
failed to comply with licensing and prevailing wage laws, or com-
mitted unfair labor practices are not uncommon. One of the obvi-
ous, and admitted, purposes of making such allegations is to place
economic pressure on the targeted employer. 6 Identification of
employer violations can also provide the basis for economic and
unfair labor practice strikes. 7 Finally, unions contend that the use
of such tactics is necessary to create a level playing field by ensuring
that non-union contractors do not enjoy a competitive advantage
by virtue of their non-compliance with the law.
An administrative law judge who has heard a number of "salt-
ing" cases has written that "the goals of the salting program...
which could be separate or overlapping depending on local cir-
cumstance," are as follows:
1. To put union members on ajobsite so as to enable the
Union to organize the Company's employees in order
to gain recognition either voluntarily or through a
NLRB election.
2. To get union people on the job and create enough
trouble by way of strikes, lawsuits, unfair labor practice
12. See Town & Country Elec., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1252.
13. See id.
14. Id. at 1257; Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1230 (1992).
15. See Town & Country Elec., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1256; Sunland Constr. Co., 309
N.L.R.B. at 1229.
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charges and general tumult, so that the nonunion con-
tractor walks away from the job.
3. If number 2 does not work, to create enough problems
for the employer by way of unfair labor practice
charges, Davis Bacon, OSHA, or legal allegations re-
quiring legal services so that even if the employer does
not walk away from the job, he will be reluctant to bid
for similar work in the local area ever again.1
8
Although the NLRB affirmed the judge's findings of violations
in that case, it did not rely on "the judge's irrelevant discussion...
of the goals of the Union's salting program." 19
B. Prima Facie Case and Rebuttal
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) pro-
vides in relevant part that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and shall have the right to refrain from any or all such ac-
tivities . . 0
Section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA states that it is an "unfair labor
practice" (and therefore unlawful) for an employer "by discrimina-
tion in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in a labor organization ... ,,21 It has long been settled that Section
8(a) (3)'s prohibition extends to job applicants. 2 More recently, in
NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.,23 the United States Supreme
Court definitively held that paid union organizers are "employees"
within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the NLRA. On remand, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, in agreement with the
18. IPPLI, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 463, 465 (1996).
19. Id. at 465 n.1.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994).
22. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 181-82 (1941) (stating
"Discrimination against union labor in the hiring of men is a dam to self organiza-
tion at the source of supply. The effect of such discrimination is not confined to
the actual denial of employment; it inevitably operates against the whole idea of
the legitimacy of organization.")
23. 516 U.S. 85, 86 (1995).
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NLRB, that the employer, Town & Country, had violated Section
8(a) (3) by refusing to consider for hire ten paid union organizers,
including two professional staff members employed full-time by the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), who had
applied for available jobs.
The analytical framework for deciding discrimination cases
that turn on employer motivation is set forth in Wright Line, a deci-
sion of the NLRB. 25 The Supreme Court upheld the Wright Line
analysis in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.26
The elements of a Section 8(a) (3) violation in a refusal-to-hire
case are as follows:
[T]he General Counsel specifically must establish that
each alleged discriminatee submitted an employment ap-
plication, was refused employment, was a union member
or supporter, was known or suspected to be a union sup-
porter by the employer, who harbored antiunion animus,
and who refused to hire the alleged discriminatee because
of that animus.
7
The General Counsel must make a "prima facie showing suffi-
cient to support the inference that protected conduct was a 'moti-
vating factor' in the employer's decision" to refuse to hire or con-
sider for hire. If the General Counsel is successful in this regard,
the burden shifts to the employer to show that it would have re-
jected the applicant for reasons unrelated to union membership or
support.-
The remedy in a meritorious refusal-to-hire case includes rein-
30statement and backpay. If the jobs that applicants applied for no
longer exist (for example, because the project has ended), the ap-
plicants are entitled to reinstatement in current, equivalent posi-
24. See Town & Country Elec. v. NLRB, 106 F.3d 816, 821 (8th Cir. 1997).
25. See Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
26. 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983).
27. Clock Elec., Inc., Nos. 8-CA-26560 & 8-CA-26646, 1997 WL 397544, at *7
(N.L.R.B. July 14,1997) (citing Big E's Foodland, 242 N.L.R.B. 963, 968 (1979)).
The NLRB's General Counsel prosecutes cases before the NLRB. See 129 U.S.C. §
153(d) (1994).
28. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089. The General Counsel's burden is
one of persuasion and not merely of production. See Manno Elec., 321 N.L.R.B.
278, 280 n.12 (1996).
29. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. at 1089.
30. See B E & K Constr. Co., 321 N.L.R.B. 561, 561-62 (1996), enforcement de-
nied on other grounds, 133 F.3d. 1372 (11th Cir. 1997).
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tions unless the employer can show that it would not have assigned
those employees to otherjobs elsewhere."'
A recurring remedial problem in salting cases is that there are
more applicants than available jobs. In that circumstance, the
NLRB defers the determination of reinstatement and back pay to a
compliance proceeding. The General Counsel bears the burden of
showing that non-discriminatory consideration would have resulted
in the hiring of particular employees for positions that became
available after the employees submitted job applications. If the
General Counsel meets that burden, the employees are entitled to
back pay attributable to any such jobs. The employees are also en-
titled to an offer of reinstatement to any current equivalent posi-
tions, unless the employer can show that its personnel policies and
procedures do not provide for retaining employees and reassigning
them to jobs at other sites after the termination of a particular pro-
32ject.
III. BEYOND THE BAsIcs
A. Are "Salts"Eligible Voters in an NLRB Election?
One of the suggested bases for concluding that paid union or-
ganizers are not "employees" within the meaning of Section 2(3)
3
of the NLRA is that a contrary conclusion would interfere with em-
ployee self-determination rights. The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has reasoned that:
Once employed, [the organizer] would have the same
right as any other employee to vote in elections concern-
ing union representation. Unlike other employees, how-
ever, [the organizer], because of his simultaneous em-
ployment with the union, would essentially be paid by the
union to cast his ballot in its favor."
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Zachry is inconsistent with
traditional NLRB law. As the NLRB noted in Oak Apparel,5 "[t]he
distinction between an employee's status with respect to the ap-
31. See id. at 562 nn.8-9 (citing Dean Gen. Contractors, 285 N.L.R.B. 573
(1987)).
32. See BE & K Constr. Co., 321 N.L.R.B. at 562.
33. 129 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994) (defining the term "employees" within the
meaning of the NLRA).
34. H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 74 (4th Cir. 1989).
35. 218 N.L.R.B. 701, 701 (1975).
[Vol. 24
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propriate unit and his or her status as an 'employee' within the
meaning of Section 2(3) of the NLRA has been recognized since
the infancy of the administration of the NLRA."36 The Supreme
Court has upheld this distinction between employee status and vot-
ing eligibility in other contexts. In the context of salting, the
NLRB has noted that paid union organizers may be excluded from
voting in an NLRB-conducted election and from any resulting bar-
gaining unit either because they are "temporary" employees or be-
cause they do not otherwise share a community of interest with
38other employees. Thus, the voting eligibility status of paid union
organizers is determined in the same manner as with other statu-
tory employees. The result has been that "paid union organizers
frequently are excluded from voting....""
B. Salting as a Means to Circumvent Lechmere ?
The general rule with respect to employee work place solicita-
tion is twofold. First, there is a presumption that an employer may
not prohibit employees from engaging in work place solicitation
during non-working time.40 Second, there is a presumption that an
employer may prohibit work place solicitation during working
time.41 These presumptions can be rebutted by "special circum-
stances," including the nature of the work place itself.42 In order to
36. Id.
37. See NLRB v. Action Automotive, Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 499 (1985) (uphold-
ing exclusion of certain relatives of management from voting eligibility and bar-
gaining unit notwithstanding status as statutory employees); NLRB v. Hendricks
County Rural Elec. Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 188 (1981) (excluding certain "confiden-
tial" employees from voting eligibility).
38. See Town & Country Elec., 309 N.L.R.B. 1250, 1256-57 (1992); Sunland
Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1229 (1992).
39. Id.
40. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945). The
Court noted, "It is no less true that time outside working hours, whether before or
after work, or during luncheon or rest periods, is an employee's time to use as he
wishes without unreasonable restraint, although the employee is on company
property." Id. at 803 n.10.
41. See id. The Court emphasized, "Working time is for work. It is therefore
within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting
union solicitation during working hours." Id.
42. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 507 (1978) (holding that
health care facility seeking to maintain tranquil environment for patients was jus-
tified in prohibiting solicitation); In re May Dep't. Stores, 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 981
(1944), enforced as modified, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 725
(1946) (holding that retail department store could restrict solicitation on retail
selling floor because of the disruptive effect on customers).
1998]
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be valid, a no-solicitation rule must be promulgated for a lawful,
non-discriminatory reason and cannot be enforced to prohibit only
Section 7 conduct.
43
The analysis is quite different when non-employee union or-
ganizers attempt to solicit members. The general rule, noted by
the Supreme Court in Lechmerej is that an employer has the right
to exclude non-employee union organizers from its property.45 Ac-
cess is granted only in the rare situation where the union has no
other reasonable means of communication with employees. 6 For
47example, a remote construction site, like a remote logging camp,
might give rise to a right of access that would not otherwise exist.
Regardless of location, an employer's no-access rules cannot be en-
forced to discriminate against union solicitation.48
In Town & Country, 49 the Supreme Court concluded that job
applicants are employees within the meaning of the NLRA, even
applicants who are "paid union organizers. "5  The question that
arises is whether the Supreme Court's holding in Town & Coun-
try-that applicants are employees-undercuts its holdings in
Lechmere and Babcock & Wilcox" by granting non-employee union
organizers the same rights that employees possess. In a decision
issued before Town & Country, the Fourth Circuit concluded that if
a paid union organizer were an "employee" within the meaning of
the NLRA, employers would be required to permit the organizer
"to solicit and organize on its property because he was claiming en-
43. See Head Div., AMF, Inc. v. NLRB, 593 F.2d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 1979).
44. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
45. See id. at 538.
46. See id.
47. See NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir.
1948) (holding that there must be reasonable rules governing access to otherwise
inaccessible employees).
48. See Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 535 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 436
U.S. 180, 205 (1978)). The law is unsettled as to what constitutes "discrimination"
in this context. See Cleveland Real Estate Partners v. NLRB, 95 F.3d 457, 465 (6th
Cir. 1996) (rejecting NLRB's conclusion that "discrimination" consists of permit-
ting access to non-labor groups but denying it to labor groups, and holding that
discrimination in this context means "favoring one union over another, or allow-
ing employer-related information while barring similar union-related informa-
tion"); Riesbeck Food Markets, 315 N.L.R.B. 940, 941 (1994) (comparing Board's
approach with those of various courts of appeals).
49. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec. Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995).
50. Id. at 97.
51. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (concluding that an
employer may validly prevent non-employee distribution of union literature if
other channels of communication are reasonably available).
[Vol. 24
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trance as a 'job applicant,"' and that this would "render ineffective
the protection offered employers in the Babcock decision."52  A
member of the NLRB and several commentators have reached
similar conclusions. For example, in discussing the NLRB's deci-
sion in Sunland Construction Co.,54 a companion case to Town &
Country, the authors of ajournal article opine that:
By declaring that non-employee organizers are employees
with full access to the employer's premises, the Sunland decision
eviscerates Lechmere's holding and throws open the employer's
gates as soon as an organizer completes an ordinary job
application, without regard to the availability of jobs or
the suitability of the organizer for the available work, and
without the slightest inquiry into the bona fides of the or-
ganizer's application.
Do the NLRB's Sunland Construction and Town & Country deci-
sions really stand for the proposition that unions and their organ-
izers can now circumvent Lechmere and gain "full access to the em-
ployer's premises" by the simple act of completing a job
application? Neither those cases nor any subsequent NLRB cases
have so held. Moreover, Justice Thomas, Lechmere's author, and all
five of Lechmere's concurring justices joined the Court's unanimous
52. H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 74 (4th Cir. 1989).
53. See Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1233 (1992) (Member Raud-
abaugh, concurring).
54. 309 N.L.R.B. 1224 (1992).
55. Michael J. Bartlett, et al., Sunland Construction Company: Are Union Organ-
izers Necessarily Bona Fide Applicants?, 45 LAB. L.J. 277, 288 (1994) (emphasis
added). See also R. Wayne Estes, et al., Missing Analytical Link in Supreme Court's
'Salting' Decision Disturbs Balance of Union-Management Rights: A Critical Analysis of
NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, 30 IND. L. REv. 445, 460 (1997) (stating, "Essen-
tially, Town & Country permits unions to accomplish indirectly what Lechmere pre-
vents them from doing directly").
56. Although the NLRB did not expressly address the question whether a
paid union organizer could gain access to an employer's private property through
the simple expedient of filing an application for employment, identical language
in both Sunland and Town & Country supports the conclusion that it would answer
that question in the negative. The NLRB stated:
Although gaining such access [to an employer's private property] likely
will facilitate the paid organizer's union activities, as long as the organ-
izer is able, available, and fully intends to work for the employer if hired,
he will not be disqualified from "employee" status. Further, a paid union
organizer employee arguably poses no greater threat to an employer's
property rights than a prounion employee who voluntarily engages in
organizational activity.
Sunland Construction Co., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1229-30 n.35 (emphasis added); Town &
Country Elec., 309 N.L.R.B. 1250, 1257 n.34 (1992).
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Town & Country decision." Either these six justices failed to recog-
nize that Town & Country effectively overruled Lechmere in substan-
tial part, or Town & Country cannot be broadly interpreted as
granting non-employee union organizers the rights of access that
they were denied in Lechmere.
The contention that Town & Country "eviscerates Lechmere's
holding" ignores the rationale underlying the Court's earlier deci-
sions in Republic Aviation58 and Babcock & Wilcox.59 As the Court ex-
plained in Hudgens v. NLRB,6W those cases strike a "wholly different
balance" between the rights of employees and non-employees to
engage in organizational activities on an employer's property be-
cause the former, unlike the latter, are "already rightfully on the
employer's property." In this circumstance, employee organiza-
tional activities implicate "the employer's management interests
rather than his property interests .... "61  The Court added that
"[t]his difference is 'one of substance."'6 2 Thus, the critical differ-
ence between employees and non-employees in this context is that
the employer has affirmatively granted the former, but not the lat-
ter, access to its property. It has done so by hiring employees and
assigning them to perform duties on its property.
In contrast, an employer does not affirmatively grant any simi-
lar right of access to property to individuals who merely submit job
applications. If it were otherwise, alljob applicants-regardless of
whether the applicants are union organizers or ordinary job seek-
ers-would have a right of access to an employer's property simply
because they had submitted an application. Accordingly, until the
non-employee organizer is hired and assigned duties, he or she
cannot be considered to be "already rightfully on the employer's
property." The contention that Town & Country "eviscerates Lech-
mere' holding" and grants non-employee organizers "full access to
the employer's premises... as soon as an organizer completes an
ordinary job application" is therefore simply incorrect.
Further support for this conclusion can be found in cases deal-
ing with the rights of off-duty employees to gain access to an em-
ployer's premises to engage in organizing activities. In Tri-County
57. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec. Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995).
58. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
59. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).





William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss3/2
"SALTING" THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Medical Center,63 the NLRB held that a no-access rule concerning
off-duty employee organizers is valid only if the rule:
(1) limits access solely with respect to the interior of the
plant and other working areas; (2) is clearly disseminated
to all employees; and (3) applies to off-duty employees
seeking access to the plant for any purpose and not just to
those employees engaging in union activity. Finally, ex-
cept where justified by business reasons, a rule which de-
nies off-duty employees entry to parking lots, gates, and
other outside nonworking areas will be found invalid.
Significantly, the NLRB has expressly rejected the contention
that Lechmere applies to off-duty employees.5 The NLRB's rationale
for distinguishing the access rights of off-duty employee organizers
and non-employee organizers is as follows:
By virtue of the continuing employment relationship, an off-duty
employee, even if not scheduled to work on the day he
seeks access to the premises, remains an employee of the
employer. Unlike the non-employee union organizer
whose status as a trespasser invokes the employer's prop-
erty right to restrict access, an off-duty employee is a
"stranger" neither to the property nor to the employees
working there.6
Unlike an off-duty employee, a non-employee union organizer
who has submitted an application but who has not been hired does
not have a "continuing employment relationship" with the em-
ployer.6' Rather, the non-employee organizer retains his status as a
"stranger" to the property and to the employees working there.
The Court's holding in Town & Country notwithstanding, employ-
ers retain their (non-discriminatory) Lechmere right to bar non-
63. 222 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1976).
64. Id.
65. Nashville Plastic Products, 313 N.L.R.B. 462, 463 (1993).
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. The existence of a "continuing employment relationship" is important in
other contexts as well. See, e.g., Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 168 (1971) (holding that retirees who "had ceased
work without expectation of further employment" were not employees within the
meaning of Section 2(3)); Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 543, 546 (1989) (stating
"applicants for employment are not 'employees' within the meaning of the collec-
tive-bargaining obligations of the Act" because they "perform no services for the
employer, are paid no wages, and are under no restrictions as to other employ-
ment or activities." In addition, "there is no economic relationship between the
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employee union organizers, including those who have submitted
employment applications, from their premises.
IV. EMPLOYERS STRIKE BACK
A. Legislation
A bill styled the "Truth in Employment Act of 1997" has been
introduced in the House of Representatives. This legislation is in-
tended to outlaw salting as an organizational technique. As of this
writing, hearings have been held on the bill, but no further action
has been taken. 9
B. Application Process as Means to Prevent Salting
In a concurring opinion in Sunland Construction Co.,70 then-
NLRB member John Neil Raudabaugh suggested four possible,
non-discriminatory policies or practices that employers could law-
fully adopt in order to protect themselves from salting by paid un-
ion organizers.7 1 Under these policies or practices, employers
would refuse to consider for employment those applicants:
who are seeking temporary employment only;
who will simultaneously be employed by another em-
ployer;
who will have "moonlighting" employment; and
who will be employed by companies or other institutions
who are adversaries of the employer.72
Raudabaugh contends that an employer could lawfully refuse
to hire a paid union organizer pursuant to such policies or prac-
68. H.R. 758, 105th Cong. (1997).
69. On March 18, 1998, President Clinton threatened, in a speech to 1,200
union workers, to veto the Truth in Employment Act of 1997. See Clinton Promises
to Veto 'Salting' Bill, Addresses Right of Workers to Organize, Daily Labor Report (BNA)
No. 53, at 21 (March 19, 1998). In stressing the importance of unions to Ameri-
can society, President Clinton stated that "workers in unions typically have higher
pay, access to higher skills and better continuing education." Id. at 22. Clinton
also stated that his administration will "fight for the right to organize" and work to
increase the minimum wage over the next two years. Id. at 21-22.
70. 309 N.L.R.B. 1224 (1992) (Member Raudabaugh concurring).
71. Id. at 1232-33.
72. Id. The utility of this suggestion in the construction industry (where
most salting cases arise) is limited by virtue of the fact that employment in that
industry is typically, though not universally, temporary in nature.
[Vol. 24
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tices, but could not similarly refuse to hire an "applicant-employee
who is only a zealous union supporter.
"
,1
Trade groups and practitioners who represent management
interests in the construction industry have similarly recommended
that their members and clients adopt various hiring policies or• . 74
practices in an effort to deter salting of their businesses. For ex-
ample, one management practitioner has suggested that job appli-
cations include language emphasizing that misrepresentation or
omission of information will lead to termination. 5 Although un-
stated, the underlying idea is that if an employer hires a covert salt
and later determines that the salt misrepresented or omitted in-
formation on his or her application, including information related
to union affiliation, the misrepresentation or omission (as opposed
to union affiliation) provides a basis for lawful discharge.
The foregoing suggestions are fundamentally flawed, however.
In the absence of evidence of unlawful motivation or discrimina-
tory application, an employer's facially neutral hiring policies or
practices are generally of no concern to the NLRB.7" But if an em-
ployer adopts facially neutral hiring policies or practices for the
avowed purpose of "protecting itself against the union stratagem
[salting] involved herein,"" the employer's conduct is unlawful be-
cause salting is a lawful union activity. 7" As the NLRB said in a re-
73. Id. at 1233
74. These groups (and their respective publications) include the Associated
General Contractors of America (Preparing for COMET) and the Associated Build-
ers and Contractors, Inc. (Coping with COMET).
75. See Preparation is Key for Health Care Adm'r, 1 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (156
Analysis: News and Background Info.) 24 (Sept. 1, 1997).
76. See Industrial Constr. Servs., Inc., No. 16-CA-17186, 1997 WL 345616, at
*5 (N.L.R.B. June 19, 1997) (holding "no photocopies" policy lawful); Bay Elec.,
Nos. 1-CA-31620 & 1-CA-32903, 1997 WL 96564, at *5 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 27, 1997)
(stating policy that applications must be filled out in person and will only be ac-
cepted when an opening exists lawful); Delta Mechanical, Inc., No. 16-CA-17235,
1997 WL 87330, at *5 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 26, 1997) (stating that restrictions on when
applications are taken lawful); Belfance Elec., Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 945, 946 (1995)
(giving preference in hiring to friends, relatives or former employees lawful); and
VOS Elec., Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 745, 753 (1992) (same).
77. Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1232 (1992) (Member Raud-
abaugh, concurring). This article does not address the obvious legal and ethical
problems associated with falsely testifying that a facially neutral hiring policy or
practice was adopted for legitimate business reasons. Suffice it to say that proof
that an employer's stated reason is false will permit an inference that the true rea-
son is an unlawful reason. See Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d
466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966).
78. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). In addition, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA
broadly prohibits employers from discriminating against, or otherwise interfering
1998l
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cent case, "When, as here, an employer implements a rule with the
purpose of restricting or preventing employees from engaging in a
protected activity, Section 8(a)(1) has been violated."79 In addi-
tion, the refusal to hire (or to consider for hire) an employee pur-
suant to a facially neutral but unlawfully-motivated rule violates
Section 8(a) (3) and exposes the employer to potential backpay and
other remedial liability. °
Similarly, simply inserting language in job applications indicat-
ing that misrepresentation or omission of information will lead to
termination does not necessarily provide a safe haven and privilege
discharge. The NLRB has held that misrepresentations or omis-
sions on an employment application do not automatically privilege
discharge or preclude a remedy where there is other evidence of
unlawful motivation.8 ' The employer bears the burden of establish-
ing that falsification on an employment application would have led
to termination based on a preexisting, non-discriminatory policy."2
If the employer can sustain this burden, backpay may be limited to
the point in time when the employer learns of the falsification."
Even facially neutral policies or practices that are not adopted
for demonstrably unlawful reasons or are disparately applied may
be unlawful if they are "inherently destructive" of employee Section
7 rights. The NLRB has held that an employer's application policy
requiring that applicants disclose their union affiliation in order to
be considered for employment is "inherently destructive" of their
with, restraining or coercing, employees, including applicants, who engage in law-
ful union or other concerted activity. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3).
79. Tualatin Elec., Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1237, 1237 (1995) (citation omitted).
Similarly, in Starcon, Inc., No. 13-CA-32719, 1997 WL 328824, at *9 (N.L.R.B.
June 13, 1997), the Board adopted an administrative law judge's conclusion that
.an employer who establishes application and hiring procedures designed to im-
pede or screen out union applicants violates Section 8(a)(3)." The general legal
principles involved in these cases have been settled for decades. See Peyton Pack-
ing Co., Inc., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943) (stating, "a rule [prohibiting union so-
licitation during working hours] must be presumed to be valid in the absence of evi-
dence that it was adopted for a discriminatory purpose") (emphasis added), cited with
approval in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803-04 n.10 (1945).
80. See Tualatin Elec., Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. at 1237 (stating "no moonlighting"
policy unlawful because adopted in response to lawful union activity); H.B. Zachry
Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 967, 968 (1995) (discussing "no extraneous information on ap-
plication" policy).
81. See Pan American Elec., 321 N.L.R.B. 473 (1996).
82. Escada (USA), Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 845, 845 n.4 (1991), enforced, 970 F.2d
898 (3d Cir. 1992).
83. John Cuneo, Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 856, 857 n.7 (1990).
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Section 7 rights."' Conversely, the NLRB expressly adopted an ad-
ministrative law judge's alternative holding that an employer's pol-
icy prohibiting applicants from putting "extraneous information" on
their applications in order to be considered for employment was
"inherently destructive" of their Section 7 rights to openly declare
their union support and solidarity."5
The bottom line here is clear. Putting aside hiring policies or
practices that raise comparatively rare "inherently destructive" is-
sues, facially neutral hiring criteria that are adopted for non-
discriminatory reasons and are not disparately applied to Section 7
protected conduct are not prohibited by the NLRA. Thus, a "no
moonlighting" policy would be lawful if adopted because of a con-
cern that additional employment raises safety or other perform-
ance issues. On the other hand, such a policy would be unlawful if
adopted to deter employees from engaging in salting or other pro-
tected conduct. The circumstances under which an employer
adopts or changes its hiring criteria, and the bona fides of the prof-
fered justification for doing so, are critical in determining their le-
gality.86
C. Salting and State Court Lawsuits
The interplay and potential conflict between state and federal
law in the context of labor relations have resulted in three catego-
ries of cases: (1) cases in which a party claims that state law cannot
be enforced because federal law preempts state law; (2) cases in
which a party claims that state law cannot be enforced because the
objective sought is illegal under federal law; and (3) cases in which
a party claims that state law cannot be enforced because the em-
ployer filed suit in retaliation for the exercise of federal rights. 7
84. Contractor Servs., Inc., Nos. 10-CA-28856, 10-CA-29123 & 10-CA-29174,
1997 WL 724879, at *2 n.4 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 8, 1997).
85. H.B. Zachry Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 967, 980-81 (1995).
86. See Starcon, Inc., No. 13-CA-32719, 1997 WL 328824 (N.L.R.B. June 13,
1997) (stating that changed policy made it virtually impossible for union-affiliated
employees to apply and proffered justification for change was pretextual); Casey
Elec., 313 N.L.R.B. 774 (1994) (changes in hiring procedure and pattern of ad-
vertising, together with failure to tell applicants about new hiring procedure, were
designed to screen out union applicants).
87. Similar issues can arise in cases that are brought in federal court. See
Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers' Int'l Union, 320 N.L.R.B. 133 (1995).
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1. Garmon Preemption Cases
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,88 the United
States Supreme Court held that " [w] hen an activity is arguably sub-
ject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the States as well as the federal
courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National La-
bor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with na-
tional policy is to be averted."8 9 Exceptions to the Garmon rule of
preemption have been recognized "where the activity regulated was
a merely peripheral concern" of the NLRA.9° Exceptions have also
been recognized "where the regulated conduct touched interests
so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the ab-
sence of compelling Congressional direction, we could not infer
that Congress deprived the States of the power to act."9' Certain
forms of tortious or otherwise unlawful conduct fall within these
exceptions.92
The Supreme Court further refined Garmon preemption in
Sears, Roebuck & Co.93 In Sears, the employer sought to enjoin peace-
ful union picketing on its property. The Court held that although
the union's picketing was arguably protected by Section 7, state
court jurisdiction was not preempted because the union had not
filed a charge and because the employer therefore lacked a forum
for deciding whether its property rights had been invaded.
94
Where the union files a charge, however, the NLRB can adjudicate
the conflicting claims of employee Section 7 rights and employer
property rights.
95
Filing a preempted lawsuit is not by itself unlawful under the
NLRA. Rather, a preempted lawsuit "can be condemned as an un-
fair labor practice" only if it is also "unlawful under traditional
NLRA principles. 96 In Manno Electric,97 the NLRB applied the rule
88. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
89. Id. at 244-45.
90. See id. at 243-44.
91. See id.
92. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpen-
ters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (trespass); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters &Join-
ers, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Linn v.
Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (defamation).
93. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
94. See id. at 202-03.
95. See id. at 207.
96. Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers' Int'l Union, 320 N.L.R.B.
133, 138 (1995).
97. 321 N.L.R.B. 278 (1996).
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of Garmon preemption to an employer's state court lawsuit filed in
response to a union's organizing campaign, which included overt
salting. The NLRB upheld the administrative law judge's conclu-
sion that the suit interfered with employees' rights to file charges
with the NLRB, to engage in other concerted activities through a
"job targeting program,"98 and to seek employment for organizing
purposes.9 Since interference with such rights would independ-
ently violate Section 8(a) (1) of the NLRA, the lawsuit itself would
be unlawful under traditional NLRA principles.
In Loehmann's Plaza,'° the NLRB considered another aspect of
preemption: when does preemption occur? The NLRB concluded
that preemption occurs when the General Counsel issues a com-
plaint. 0' If the NLRB ultimately concludes that the conduct is un-
protected by the NLRA, the state court suit can be revived. 10 2 If, on
the other hand, the NLRB concludes that the conduct is protected,
the NLRB's decision supersedes any contrary decision of the state
court.10 3 The remedy for post-complaint prosecution of the state
court lawsuit involving protected conduct includes reimbursement
of legal expenses incurred in defending the suit after the point of
preempton.104
2. Illegal Object Cases
It is well-settled that the NLRB has the authority to enjoin
prosecution of a state court lawsuit that seeks to achieve an objec-
tive that is prohibited by the federal labor laws. 10 5 In Manno Electric,
the NLRB affirmed the administrative law judge's conclusion that a
lawsuit has an illegal objective "if it is aimed at achieving a result
98. Id. at 298. A "job targeting program" involves the use of union funds to
supplement the wages of employees who work for a union contractor. The union
contractor can then bid on jobs against non-union contractors who enjoy a com-
petitive advantage because of lower wage rates. Unions are thereby able to both
preserve the union wage scale and obtain work for their members. See id.
99. Id. at 297-98.
100. 305 N.L.R.B. 663 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 316 N.L.R.B. 109 (1995).
101. Id. at 670.
102. Id. at 671-72 n.56.
103. Id. at 672 n.59.
104. Id. at 672.
105. See, e.g., Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Union, 187 N.L.R.B.
636, 636 (1970), enforcement denied, 446 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 213
(1972) (enjoining from pursuing state court lawsuit to enforce union fine that
could not be lawfully imposed under the NLRA).
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incompatible with the objectives of the [NLRA] ."'0 In Manno Elec-
tric, an electrical contractor filed a state court lawsuit against a local
union, its representatives, and individuals who either had worked
for or applied for work with the contractor.' 7 Among the allega-
tions of the state court lawsuit were that the defendants had made
false and defamatory statements about the contractor to the NLRB.
The administrative law judge, concluding that one of the objectives
of the NLRA is to provide free access to the NLRB, found that be-
cause the state court lawsuit sought to discourage worker access to
the NLRB, the lawsuit was incompatible with the objectives of the
NLRA.'0 8
3. Retaliatory Lawsuits
In BillJohnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB'9 the Supreme Court
held that the NLRB could not, consistent with the First Amend-
ment right to petition the government for redress of grievances,
enjoin a well-founded state court lawsuit even if the suit were filed
in retaliation for the exercise of rights protected under Section 7 of
the NLRA. The Court held, however, that the NLRB could enjoin
such a suit if the NLRB found that the suit lacked a "reasonable
basis.""1 The obvious question is how the NLRB should undertake
this "reasonable basis" analysis. The Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the NLRB's inquiry may not go beyond the "four
corners" of the complaint."' Rather, the Court attempted to strike
a balance:
Although the [NLRB's] reasonable-basis inquiry need not
be limited to the bare pleadings, if there is a genuine is-
sue of material fact that turns on credibility of witnesses or
on the proper inference to be drawn from undisputed
facts, it cannot, in our view, be concluded that the suit
should be enjoined."'
Yet, the Court also said that the NLRB need not stay its hand
"if the plaintiffs position is plainly foreclosed as a matter of law or
106. 321 N.L.R.B. 278, 297 (1996).
107. Id. at 279.
108. Id.
109. 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
110. Id. at 745-49.
111. Id. at 744.
112. Id. at 744-45.
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is otherwise frivolous.". Significantly, the Court emphasized that
its holding was confined to state court lawsuits that were filed for a
retaliatory purpose.114
On remand, the NLRB concluded that the employer restau-
rant had violated Section 8(a) (4) and (1) of the NLRA by filing
and prosecuting a state court lawsuit against certain of its employ-
ees."5 The restaurant sued after the employees had engaged in
picketing and handbilling to protest certain work-related griev-
ances."6 The suit alleged that the employees had engaged in mass
picketing and harassment, blocked ingress to and egress from its
facility, and created a threat to public safety. 1 7 The state court
granted summary, judgment against the employer on those
claims."" Because the state court granted summary judgment, the
NLRB held that a portion of the employer's suit lacked a reason-
able basis."9 The NLRB also held that since the restaurant sued
simply because the employees had filed a charge with the NLRB
and engaged in concerted protected activities, the employer's law-
suit was filed for a retaliatory motive.' 20 As part of the remedy, the
NLRB ordered the employer to reimburse the employees for attor-
neys' fees and other expenses incurred in defending the non-
meritorious state court claims."'
113. Id. at 747.
114. Id. at 737-38 n.5. The Court further emphasized that its holding in Bill
Johnson's Restaurants did not apply to lawsuits which were preempted by federal
labor laws or to lawsuits with unlawful objectives. See id.
115. BillJohnson's Restaurants, 290 N.L.R.B. 29, 31 (1988).
116. Id. at 29.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 31-32.
120. Id. Subsequent relevant cases include Johnson & Hardin Co., 305
N.L.R.B. 690, 692 (1991) (holding that criminal trespass complaint filed against
union organizers by employer with no rights to relevant property was meritless
and retaliatory), enforced in relevant part, 49 F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 1995); Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. 47, 47-48 (1989) (summarily dismissing libel suit
seeking large punitive damages held meritless and retaliatory); Summittville Tiles,
Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. 64, 66 (1990) (holding that lawsuit against employees for mali-
cious prosecution because they previously filed unfair labor practice charge was
meridess and retaliatory).
121. See BillJohnson's Restaurants, 290 N.L.R.B. at 32-33. The Circuit Courts of
Appeals have generally agreed with the Board's position that a reimbursement
remedy can be extended to both employees and unions. See Geske & Sons, Inc., v.
NLRB, 103 F.3d 1366, 1378-79 (7th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases). But seeJohnson
& Hardin Co. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 237, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding that a re-
imbursement remedy is limited to employees).
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4. Discovery
Both state and federal civil proceedings allow for broad dis-
covery procedures. For example, Rule 26.02(a) of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure, which is derived from Rule 26(b) (1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or
defense of the party, seeking discovery or to the claim or
defense of any other party, including the existence, de-
scription, nature, custody, condition and location of
books, documents, or other tangible things and the iden-
tity and location of persons having knowledge of any dis-
coverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if that
information appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. 2
Although Rule 26.02(a) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides for broad discovery, it does not provide for unlim-
ited discovery. Rather, Rule 26.02(a) limits discovery to matters
that are "not privileged." 23 Thus, a discovery request cannot be
used to require production of otherwise privileged information. If
the information sought is privileged as a matter of federal law, it is
not discoverable under state law.2 4 In addition, Rule 26.02(a) lim-
its discovery to a matter "which is relevant to the subject matter in-
volved in the pending action ... .,,125 Thus, a discovery request
must satisfy a threshold test of relevance. If the information sought
is not "relevant," there is no reasonable basis under Minnesota
state law for requesting the information through discovery. 2 6
5. Discovery and the Federal Labor Laws
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of
122. MINN. R. CIv. P. 26.02 (a).
123. Id.
124. See Sola Elec. Co. v.Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) (stating,
"[i] t is familiar doctrine that the prohibition of a federal statute may not be set at
naught, or its benefits denied, by state statutes or state common law rules).
125. Id.
126. Id. Discovery requests can independently constitute an unfair labor prac-
tice. See Manno Elec., Inc. 321 N.L.R.B. 278, 298 (1996); see also Halloran v.
Fisher Foods, Inc., 96 L.R.R.M. 3093, 3095 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (denying defen-
dant's motion to compel discovery related to NLRB affidavits or their contents).
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the scope of discovery in Bill Johnson's Restaurants.127 However, it
would be pointless to allow a suit to progress while making it pro-
cedurally impossible for a plaintiff to establish that its suit had
merit. Accordingly, we must assume that the Court intended that
plaintiffs in a BillJohnson's Restaurants case could pursue discovery
in order to establish the merits of their suit. A significant question
remains, however: do federal laws place any limitations on the
scope of discovery in a state court lawsuit?
a. Scope of Discovery: Garmon Preemption Analysis
The rationale underlying Garmon preemption is protection of
the NLRB's primary jurisdiction to adjudicate conduct that is
clearly, or even arguably, protected by Section 7 or prohibited by
Section 8.128 Garmon preemption is jurisdictional in nature: "[a]
claim of Garmon preemption is a claim that the state court has no
power to adjudicate the subject matter of the case, and when a
claim of Garmon preemption is raised, it must be considered and
resolved by the state court."
1 29
It is well settled that Garmon preemption imposes limits on
state substantive law in the area of labor relations. For example, in
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America Local 114,'30 the United
States Supreme Court imposed a standard derived from New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan13 1 on state libel actions that arose in the con-
text of labor relations. 3 2 Similarly, in Farmer v. United Brotherhood of
Carpenters &Joiners of America Local 25,133 the Court relied on the
federal labor laws in imposing limitations on state causes of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.TM The policy justifi-
cation underlying these limitations on state substantive law-avoid-
ance of "the potential for interference with the federal regulatory
scheme"35-is no less applicable to state procedural law.
Unlike state and federal civil litigation, discovery in NLRB
proceedings is extremely limited.136 For example, statements given
127. 461 U.S. 731, 733 (1983).
128. Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 468 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1984).
129. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 393
(1986).
130. 383 U.S. 53, 55 (1966).
131. 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
.132. Linn, 383 U.S. at 65.
133. 430 U.S. 290, 292 (1977).
134. Id. at 295.
135. Id. at 297.
136. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 236-37 (1978).
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to the NLRB during the course of an investigation are not pro-
ducible under the Freedom of Information Act..7 or otherwise un-
less the witness testifies at trial. To require production of such
statements would "necessarily... interfere in the statutory sense
with the Board's enforcement proceedings." 1' The identities of
employees who signed union authorization cards or attended un-
ion meetings are likewise protected from disclosure.' 9 Further,
Section 8 (a) (1) of the NLRA generally prohibits intrusive question-
ing of employees concerning their or other employees' Section 7
activities.' 40 Depositions are permitted only upon a showing of
"good cause."'14  Under the NLRB's interpretation, the "good
cause" rule generally does not permit pretrial discovery. Rather,
the rule simply provides a device for preserving evidence, including
deposing a witness whose testimony will be unavailable for trial.
4
2
Thus, the scope of discovery in NLRB proceedings differs markedly
from that available in civil litigation generally.
State court civil lawsuits sometimes raise substantive issues that
parallel issues in an NLRB proceeding. The domain of relevant
evidence in the two proceedings, therefore, inevitably overlaps. If
the issues in the two proceedings substantially overlap, the state
court (or, for that matter, the federal court) would lack jurisdic-
tion 14 and the discovery issue would simply dissolve. But suppose
Considerations of undue delay and the possibility of intimidation of employee
witnesses by their employer are among the reasons advanced for not providing
pretrial discovery in NLRB proceedings. See id. at 239-42.
137. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (1994) (exempting certain information from disclo-
sure). See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. at 242-43. The statements
are not producible even if copies have been given to a union. H.B. Zachry Co.,
310 N.L.R.B. 1037, 1038 (1993).
138. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. at 243 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
139. See National Telephone Directory Corp., 319 N.L.R.B. 420, 422 (1995).
140. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (a) (1) (1994). The Board's approach in deciding
whether questioning employees is unlawful is set forth in Rossmore House, 269
N.L.R.B. 1176, 1176 (1984), enforced, Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees
Union, Local 11 v. N.L.R.B., 760 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1985). One exception
allows questioning employees during pretrial preparation in the defense of an un-
fair labor practice proceeding provided that certain safeguards are observed. See
Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 770, 775 (1964), enforcement denied, 344 F.2d
617, 621 (8th Cir. 1965) (concluding that the NLRB's factual determinations were
not supported by substantial evidence).
141. 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1997).
142. Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 893 F.2d 1468, 1484-85 (3d Cir.
1990); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 859-60 (2d Cir. 1970).
143. Bakery Workers Local 6 (Stroehmann Bakeries), 320 N.L.R.B. 133, 137-
38 (1995) (federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve
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the case involves conduct that is of "peripheral concern" to the
federal labor laws or involves interests that are "deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility," falling within one of the Garmon
exceptions. Also suppose that one of the reasons, if not the princi-
pal reason, for filing the state court lawsuit is to secure pretrial dis-
covery for a pending NLRB hearing. If evidence is producible un-
der broad state discovery rules but not producible under restrictive
NLRB rules, an important question arises: who decides whether
evidence is discoverable?
Traditional Garmon principles dictate that the party claiming
preemption of discovery would bear the burden of persuasion.4
The objecting party would argue that, even assuming the evidence
sought through discovery is relevant to the state court lawsuit, the
NLRB must determine whether such evidence is protected from
disclosure. In other words, the issue of whether the evidence is
protected must be "initially decided by the NLRB, not the state
courts.", 45 Therefore, the state court's jurisdiction to decide dis-
covery issues would be preempted. On the other hand, the propo-
nent of discovery would argue that the state court has authority to
resolve discovery issues pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding
in Sears, Roebuck & Co., provided that no charge involving discovery
is pending before the NLRB.'46
b. Scope of Discovery: Illegal Object Analysis
One can argue that a request for discovery of any information
that is protected under federal law or otherwise interferes with em-
ployees' union or other concerted activities "is aimed at achieving a
result incompatible with the objectives of the NLRA." 147 On this
theory, discovery would be preempted regardless of the informa-
tion's relevance to a state court proceeding. "If employee conduct
is protected under Section 7, then state law which interferes with
the exercise of these federally protected rights creates an actual
conflict and is pre-empted by direct operation of the Supremacy
plaintiffs claim because it raised representation issues that fall within the NLRB's
jurisdiction); American Pacific Concrete Pipe Co., 292 N.L.R.B. 1261, 1261-62
(1989) (state court jurisdiction preempted under Garmon because plaintiffs claim
seeks to adjudicate many of the same issues that were pending before the NLRB).
144. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 395
(1986).
145. Id. at 394.
146. See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
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Clause.' 14 Where such a conflict exists, "[t] he relative importance
to the State of its own law is not material... for the Framers of our
Constitution provided that federal law must prevail."14 9 Preemption
follows "as a matter of substantive right."' 50 Moreover, if the dis-
covery sought were essential to maintenance of the state lawsuit,
one could further argue that the entire lawsuit is preempted as an
unlawful interference with federally protected rights.'-'
c. Scope of Discovery: Retaliatory Lawsuit Analysis
In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, the United States Supreme Court
noted that "[a] lawsuit may be used by an employer as a powerful
instrument of coercion or retaliation." 52 Because of the possibility
that discovery could be used in a coercive or retaliatory manner,
discovery can be precluded altogether if a state court lawsuit is de-
monstrably baseless or otherwise interferes with the exercise of Sec-
tion 7 rights. 1 3 Thus, if the state court plaintiff "provides no evi-
dentiary basis for that suit and fails to describe what evidence he
expects to obtain through discovery and to explain why he has not
been able to obtain that evidence, the Board may properly enjoin
prosecution of that suit prior to discovery.
154
One can also argue that any discovery request that seeks in-
formation not relevant to the subject matter of the action consti-
tutes a violation of the NLRA. As developed above, 55 the elements
of a Bill Johnson's Restaurants violation are (1) that the employer
sued in retaliation for the exercise of Section 7 rights and (2) that
the lawsuit lacks a reasonable basis in fact or law. 5 6 A discovery re-
148. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 468 U.S. 491, 501 (1984).
149. Id. at 503 (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)).
150. See id.
151. Cf American Pacific Concrete Pipe Co., 292 N.L.R.B. 1261, 1262 (1989)
(explaining that the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction and state court lawsuit pre-
empted under San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) be-
cause it "seeks to adjudicate many of the same issues involved" in a proceeding
before the NLRB).
152. 461 U.S. 731, 740 (1983). The court further explained that by suing an
employee who files charges with the Board, an employer provides a notice to em-
ployees that those who file charges may subject themselves to a possible lawsuit.
See id.
153. See Geske & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 103 F.3d 1366, 1376 (7th Cir. 1997). The
Court held the plaintiff employer's suit against the union was clearly baseless, and
was filed for retaliatory reasons. See id. at 1379.
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
156. BillJohnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745-49 (1983).
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quest in furtherance of a retaliatory lawsuit would itself be retalia-
tory on the theory that it is simply a means used to achieve a re-
taliatory objective. Since a request to discover irrelevant evidence
lacks a reasonable basis in law, it follows that requests to discover
irrelevant information in support of a retaliatory lawsuit constitute
violations of Section 8(a) (1) .157
In addition, if the discovery request independently interferes
with employee Section 7 rights (for example, by seeking to elicit
otherwise protected information concerning employee union or
other concerted activities), it would a fortiori violate Section
8(a) (1). Finally, since such discovery requests lack a reasonable
basis under state law, the First Amendment considerations underly-
ing Bill Johnson's Restaurants are not present. Accordingly, the em-
ployer's conduct would be enjoinable by the NLRB as an unfair la-
bor practice.
This analysis raises a further problem. Does the state court or
the NLRB make the determination that if a discovery request lacks
a reasonable basis under state law it is therefore enjoinable under
federal law? Rule 26.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure
permits a party to seek a protective order limiting discovery. If the
defendant moves to preclude discovery on the ground that the ma-
terials sought are not relevant, the state court's ruling will effec-
tively resolve the Bill Johnson's Restaurants issue. If the state court
grants the motion, discovery is precluded as a matter of state law
and there is nothing to enjoin pursuant to Bill Johnson's Restaurants.
If the state court denies the motion, however, further proceedings
pursuant to Bill Johnson's Restaurants would be inappropriate be-
cause the state court has effectively concluded that the discovery
request has a reasonable basis under state law.
Yet, suppose the defendant does not file a motion for a protec-
tive order and instead simply files a charge with the NLRB. 5 8 In
that case, the NLRB's General Counsel initially, and the NLRB it-
self ultimately, would have to make the reasonable basis determina-
tion. That determination would require the General Counsel and
the NLRB to evaluate both substantive state law claims and the scope
157. See BillJohnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 755 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(stating "There is no constitutionally privileged method of harassing or punishing
those who exercise rights protected by Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA.").
158. Since the cost of investigating a charge and prosecuting a meritorious
charge before the NLRB is borne by the government, there is an obvious eco-
nomic incentive for filing a charge rather than seeking a protective order.
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of discovery permitted under those claims. In doing so, the Gen-
eral Counsel and the NLRB would be evaluating substantive and
procedural state law issues that are far removed from their area of
expertise." 9 Moreover, since reasonable basis in this circumstance
turns on relevance, the General Counsel and the NLRB would ef-
fectively supplant the state court as the arbiter of relevance, deter-
mining what, under state law, is discoverable. It is not difficult to
imagine that the General Counsel and the NLRB would, for practi-
cal and/or institutional reasons, "decline... the invitation to enter
that thicket."16
D. Wright Electric, Inc.
The issues discussed in this article can perhaps be best illus-
trated by a concrete example. A suit is pending in Minnesota state
court involving an electrical industry contractor's attempt to re-
dress injuries by utilizing traditional state law principles. 6' The in-
juries arose out of allegedly unprotected conduct in the context of
covert salting. 62 Not surprisingly, the defendants in that state court
suit have responded by initiating proceedings before the NLRB.1
6
1
These parallel proceedings raise exceptionally difficult and inter-
esting issues concerning the proper allocation of state and federal
authority in regulating labor-management relations.
In the fall of 1992, then-IBEW Local 292 Business Representa-
tive Michael J. Priem enlisted IBEW member Thomas A. Ouellette
to serve as a covert salt in an effort to organize the employees of
Wright Electric, Inc. (Wright Electric). T6 Ouellette filled out an
employment application with Wright Electric. 65 The application
contained language that provided in part that the information was
"true and complete" and that the applicant understood that "false
159. Cf Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 290 N.L.R.B. 29, 32 (1988) (declining to
adjudicate the merits (as opposed to the reasonable basis) of a state law claim;
also commenting that "[o]ur expertise lies in resolving labor law questions that
arise under the Act, rather than deciding claims that arise under state law.")
(footnote omitted).
160. Id.
161. See Wright Elec., Inc. & International Bhd. Of Elec. Workers, Local 292,
AFL-CIO, Nos. 18-CA-12820, 18-CA-13193, 18-CA-13369, 1996 NLRB LEXIS 778
(N.L.R.B. Nov. 26, 1996).
162. See id. at *15.
163. See id. at *1.
164. See id. at *4.
165. See id. at *3.
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or misleading" information "may result in discharge."'6 Ouellette
nonetheless misstated and omitted information that might have
disclosed that he had worked for electrical contractors that had col-
lective bargaining agreements with the IBEW.167 Wright Electric
eventually learned about these misstatements and omissions and
fired Ouellette.'6 A charge alleging that Ouellette's discharge vio-
lated Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the NLRA was dismissed.
69
On August 24, 1993, Wright Electric filed suit in Hennepin
County District Court against IBEW Local 292, Priem and Ouel-
lette. 7 The suit alleged that all three defendants deliberately mis-
represented Ouellette's employment history; that Wright Electric
would not have hired Ouellette had it known of that misrepresen-
tation or his true employment history; and that it had suffered
damages due to the false application. The suit alleged that the de-
fendants' conduct was actionable under Minnesota law as (1) a
breach of Ouellette's employment contract; (2) a breach of Ouel-
lette's fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty; (3) unjust enrichment; (4)
fraudulent misrepresentation; (5) fraudulent concealment; and (6)
wrongful use by the defendants of the Employer's physical facili-
ties, vehicles and equipment for their own purposes. 7 ' The com-
plaint further alleged that the defendants were liable for malicious
prosecution in the filing of the unfair labor practice charge con-
cerning Ouellette's discharge, and also for filing a claim for unem-
ployment compensation benefits. 72 The relief sought by Wright
Electric included (1) the costs of hiring, training and replacing
Ouellette; (2) all salary and benefits paid to Ouellette; (3) the
value of the facilities, equipment and supplies used by Ouellette;
(4) attorneys' fees and costs; (5) declaratory relief; and (6) a per-
manent injunction prohibiting the defendants from submitting
applications containing false information to any employer.1
3
Wright Electric subsequently filed an amended complaint adding a
claim for punitive damages.' 74
In support of its state court complaint, Wright Electric sought
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 4.
169. See id. at *14.
170. See id. at *12.
171. See id. at *16.
172. See id. at *17-*18.
173. See id.
174. See id. at *18.
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to discover, inter alia, IBEW Local 292's efforts to salt it and other
non-union employers. 75 In addition, Wright Electric sought to de-
pose three named "salts" and representatives of certain educational
institutions and employers at which the three salts had studied or
worked. 76 Wright Electric also sought various educational and
work records from the educational institutions and employers con-
cerning the three salts.
17 7
Hennepin County District Court Judge Stephen D. Swanson
eventually dismissed both of the malicious prosecution counts
against all three defendants for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. 78 He refused to dismiss the remaining
counts. 179
IBEW Local 292 responded to Wright Electric's state court
lawsuit by filing a charge and amended charge with the NLRB. 8 °
The Regional Director for the Eighteenth Region, on behalf of the
General Counsel, issued a series of complaints against Wright Elec-
tric with respect to the state court lawsuit, the discovery requests,
and other issues. 8 ' More specifically, the Regional Director alleged
that Wright Electric's state court malicious prosecution counts
lacked a reasonable basis and had been dismissed and that the state
court lawsuit was filed for a retaliatory basis; and that therefore the
lawsuit violated Section 8(a) (4) and (1) of the NLRA with respect
to the malicious prosecution counts.82 Thus, this aspect of the
complaint is squarely predicated on a Bill Johnson's Restaurants the-
ory of the violation. The Regional Director further alleged that the
information Wright Electric sought to discover as described above
was not relevant to its state court lawsuit and was protected infor-
mation concerning IBEW Local 292's organizing activities; that by
seeking this information Wright Electric interfered with employ-
175. See id. at *7. Wright Electric also sought to discover (1) communications
with Wright Electric's employees; (2) authorization cards received from Wright
Electric's employees; (3) charges or complaints filed against Wright Electric by
IBEW Local 292; (4) information relating to three named and other unnamed
"salts"; and (5) newsletters or informational bulletins given to members since
January 1, 1991 which urged or advised employees to misrepresent matters of fact
to employers. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id. at "19-*20.
179. Seeid. at*21.
180. See id. at *1.
181. Seeid. at*1-*2.
182. See id. at *6-*7.
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ees' exercise of their Section 7 rights; and that therefore Wright
Electric violated Section 8(a)(1) by pursuing these discovery re-
quests.' 83 Thus, the discovery aspect of the complaint is likewise
predicated on a BillJohnson's Restaurants theory.
Following a hearing on the complaints issued against Wright
Electric, Administrative Law Judge William J. Pannier III dismissed
all of the state court lawsuit and discovery allegations of the com-
plaints. 141 With respect to the malicious prosecution claims, Judge
Pannier concluded that although Judge Swanson had dismissed
those claims, they were still appealable. Since there had been no
final determination that the malicious prosecution claims lacked a
reasonable basis under Minnesota law, one of the predicates for
proceeding under Bill Johnson's Restaurants had not been satisfied.
With respect to the discovery allegations, Judge Pannier concluded
that neither he nor the NLRB would attempt to determine
whether, as a matter of state law, the materials sought were rele-
vant.85 To do so, according to Judge Pannier, would in essence in-
volve the NLRB in "micro-management of state court litigation."1
86
Judge Pannier's decision is now before the NLRB on excep-
tions. The parties in the state court lawsuit have agreed to hold
that proceeding in abeyance pending the NLRB's decision.
V. CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt that salting is generally a lawful organ-
izing technique. Although Congress has considered legislation
outlawing salting, it has not moved forward, and such legislation
currently faces administrative opposition. This is not to say, how-
ever, that employers are entirely helpless. The NLRB generally ex-
cludes paid union organizers from voting in representation elec-
tions. Also, employers may lawfully discharge a salt for falsifying an
employment application if nondiscriminatory bases exist. Moreo-
ver, salt applicants generally do not have free access to an em-
ployer's property before being hired, and encouragement to or-
ganize by employees may still be limited to appropriate times and
places.
183. See id. at *8- *9.
184. See id. at *44. Judge Pannier did conclude that Wright Electric violated
Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the NLRA by refusing to hire or consider for hire an
employee. Id. at *57.
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As the pending Wright Electric case demonstrates, there is at
present considerable uncertainty concerning the use of state court
lawsuits in the context of salting. Since both state court lawsuits
and discovery can violate the NLRA, the NLRB may be required to
consider both state substantive and procedural law in adjudicating
cases. This raises several fundamental and as yet unresolved policy
issues. The NLRB is the entity that has principal responsibility for
preventing and remedying violations of the NLRA. As the NLRB
itself has acknowledged, its area of expertise does not extend to ad-
judicating claims arising under state law. Should the NLRB play an
active or deferential role with respect to state court actions that
implicate federal labor law rights? In addition, the scope of discov-
ery under state law is generally much broader than under the
NLRA. What is the appropriate scope of discovery in cases where
state law and the NLRA overlap? The stakes are large for employ-
ers, unions and employees. On the one hand, employer state court
actions expose unions and employees to expansive discovery and
potential damages for fraud, misrepresentation and other state law
violations. On the other hand, an employer that pursues an illegal
object, preempted or retaliatory lawsuit may be liable under the
NLRA for the costs, including attorneys fees, incurred by the de-
fendants in defending against the lawsuit. Thus, the uncertainties
as to the role of the NLRB and the scope of discovery, taken to-
gether with the magnitude of the stakes involved, suggest that em-
ployers should exercise considerable caution before instituting
state court lawsuits in response to salting.
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